Chester Barnard was best known as the author of The Functions of the Executive, perhaps the 20thcentury's most influential book on management and leadership. Barnard offers a systems approach to the study of organization, which contains a psychological theory of motivation and behavior, a sociological theory of cooperation and complex inter−dependencies, and an ideology based on a meritocracy. Barnard's teachings drew on personal insights as a senior executive of ATTin the 1920s and 1930s, and he emphasized the role of the manager as both a professional and as a steward of the corporation. For leadership to be effective, it had to be perceived as legitimate, Barnard maintained. Barnard sensed that the central challenge of management was balancing both the technological and human dimensions of organization. The challenge for the executive was to communicate organizational goals and to win the cooperation of both the formal and the informal organization; but he cautioned against relying exclusively on incentive schemes to win that cooperation. Responsibility-in terms of the honor and faithfulness with which managers carry out their responsibilities−−is the most important function of the executive. Cyert & March (1963) , Dalton (1959 ), Downs (1967 ), Gouldner (1954 ), Homans (1950 , Katz & Kahn (1966 ), Likert (1961 , March & Simon (1958 ), Mayo (1945 ), McGregor (1960 ), Merton (1949 ), Mintzberg (1973 ), Selznick (1957 , Simon (1947) , Thompson (1967), and Williamson (1975) . Of particular note is the Barnard-Simon connection (Simon, 1991 (Simon, , 1994 Wolf, 1995a) . It is worth nothing, however, that although Barnard knew both Roethlisberger and Mayo, he later claimed to have known little about the Hawthorne studies, which were completed before he wrote Functions of the Executive. Barnard did serve as a major influence on Likert (1961) and McGregor (1960) .
1 As of July 25 th 2010, Barnard's (1938) Functions of the Executive had been cited over 8,000 times (Google Scholar). See Bedeian and Wren (2001) for their ranking of the top 25 most influential management books of the 20 th century with Taylor (1911) and Barnard (1938) occupying the top two positions. 2 Classic works influenced by Barnard' s The Function of the Executive include: Boulding (1956) , Coser (1956) , Cyert & March (1963) , Dalton (1959) , Downs (1967) , Gouldner (1954) , Homans (1950) , Katz & Kahn (1966) , Likert (1961) , March & Simon (1958) , Mayo (1945) , McGregor (1960) , Merton (1949) , Mintzberg (1973) , Selznick (1957) , Simon (1947) , Thompson (1967) , and Williamson (1975) . Of particular note is the Barnard-Simon connection (Simon, 1991 (Simon, , 1994 Wolf, 1995a) . It is worth nothing, however, that although Barnard knew both Roethlisberger and Mayo, he later claimed to have known little about the Hawthorne studies, which were completed before he wrote Functions of the Executive. Barnard did serve as a major influence on Likert (1961) and McGregor (1960). with the ability to apply reason to professional experiences toward developing a "science of organization " (1938: 290) .
3 Barnard (1938) emphasized the role of the manager as both a professional and as a steward of the corporation. Barnard's (1938) teachings drew on personal insights as a senior executive of AT&T, which saw good governance as the primary means of winning public acceptance of its telecommunications monopoly. Barnard's thinking also reflected a growing interest in social systems and a concern about how society, in the 1930s, would cope with the growing technological complexity of industrial life and the emergence of ever larger-scale institutions. Barnard's (1938) book, which was compiled from a series of lectures delivered in Boston during the 1930s, also sought to provide answers to the concerns of management practitioners, as well as the intellectuals who were transforming the Harvard Business School into a "West Point of Capitalism." Further, the scientific and industrial boom of the early 20 th century was fomenting a political, economic, and spiritual crisis, and Barnard's (1938) vision of professional, managerial stewardship promised to serve as a stabilizing influence on a corporatist American democracy. Barnard (1938) articulated the principal defense of managerial capitalism, and maintained that management possessed the "moral authority" to both run and modernize the nation and to harness the forces of technological change for the public good. Barnard (1938) provides the Progressive case for the consistency of the American dream with 3 In addition to developing the science of organization, Barnard also wanted to convey the art of organizing and the aesthetics of management, although he felt his shortcomings here: "Still more do I regret the failure to convey the sense of organization, the dramatic, and aesthetic feeling that surpasses the possibilities of exposition, which derives chiefly from the intimate, habitual interested experience. It is evident that many lack an interest in the science of organization because they are oblivious to the arts of organizing, not perceiving the significant elements. They miss the structure of the symphony, the art of the composition, and the skill of its execution, because they cannot hear the tones " (1938: xxxiv) .
managerial order (Scott 1992) . 4 Moreover, Barnard (1938) maintains that professional managers needed to be as dedicated, energetic, and committed to reform as their administrative counterparts in government in order to reassert their rightful leadership.
5
In almost every respect, The Functions of the Executive was decades ahead of its time. For one thing, in sharp contrast to the mechanistic conceptions of earlier management thinkers, such as Frederick Winslow Taylor, Barnard (1938) viewed the organization as a complex social system. Barnard (1938) showed a unique ability to traverse back and forth between the empirical and theoretical realms and to weave together the latest developments in psychology, sociology, and human relations. Barnard (1938) focused on the complexities of the human element in organization, on the psychological forces of human behavior, and on developing ways to manage the complexities of human behavior and to cope with its limitations (Gabor, 2000) .
Barnard emphasizes that formal organizations are "organic and evolving social systems " (1945: 178) , and that management's main challenge is achieving cooperation among the groups and individuals within this social system, in the interests of achieving 4 Mahoney (2002 4 Mahoney ( , 2005 rejects, however, the thesis of Perrow (1986) and Scott (1992 Scott ( , 1994 ) that Barnard's (1938) thinking was elitist. Indeed, Barnard's (1948) own account of "the riot of the unemployed at Trenton, N.J. 1935" shows an ability to connect with workers and a sensitivity to maintain the reciprocal acknowledgment of personal integrity. For convincing critiques of Scott (1992) , see Pauchant (1994) and Wolf (1995b) . 5 Barnard's thinking was influenced by classic Greek philosophy such as that of Plato (Godfrey, 1994) and Aristotle (Heyl, 1968) , as well as by: Adams (1913) , Bentley (1935 ), Bridgeman (1921 , Brinton (1938) , Brown (1934 ), Cardozo (1921 , Commons (1934) , Dewey (1938) , Durkheim (1933) , Ehrlich (1912 ), Follett (1924 , Henderson (1935) , Herring (1936) , Homans & Curtis (1934) , Humphrey (1933) ; Koffka (1935) , Korzybski (1933) , Lewin (1938) , Mayo (1933) , Merz (1904) , Ogden & Richards (1936) , Pareto (1935) , Parsons (1937) , Rivers (1924) , Schumpeter (1934) , Smith (1776 ), Weber (1930 ), and Whitehead (1929 . Barnard also acknowledged his friendships and correspondences with such influential thinkers as Philip Cabot, Lawrence Henderson, George Homans, Elton Mayo, and Talcott Parsons (Wolf, 1994) . In addition to Barnard (1948) , other collected works of Barnard can be found in Wolf (1974) and Wolf & Iino (1986) .
organizational goals. The magnitude of the cooperative challenge is such that "successful cooperation in or by formal organizations is the abnormal, not the normal condition.
What are observed from day to day are the successful survivors among innumerable failures … Failure to cooperate, failure of cooperation, failure of organization, disorganization, disintegration, destruction of organization -and reorganization -are characteristic facts of human history" (1938:5). Barnard also recognized the link between authority and legitimacy.
As a systems thinker, Barnard's ideas drew on his own eclectic intellectual interests, his years at AT&T, and his exposure to the so-called Harvard Circle, which reinforced his interests in the psychological and sociological aspects of management.
Although Barnard was educated at Harvard, he was not a Brahmin. He was born poor, the son of a mechanic; his mother died giving birth to his third sibling when he was just five years old. Yet the Barnards were not a typical working-class family. "I was raised into a family who were all poor people, but they were also quite intellectual. They used to argue, endless arguments for hours, on Herbert Spencer and other philosophers," Barnard recalled (Wolf, 1961: 168) . 6 Upon graduating from grammar school in Cliftondale, 6 Chester Irving Barnard was born on November 7, 1886 in Malden, Massachusetts. His father was a mechanic with grammar school education. His mother died when he was five years old and he spent a considerable amount of his childhood in the home of his grandfather who was a blacksmith (Wolf, 1961: 168) . Family life for Barnard was filled with music and with discussions on philosophy and social views. Gabor writes that: " [Barnard's] personality reflected the contradictions of a poor boy who had grown up in a working-class household where 'endless hours of arguments' centered not on the perpetual lack of money but on books and philosophy" (2000:7). In fact, Barnard's interest in philosophy was a life-long hobby for him. He read widely in philosophy and he was a member of the American Philosophical Society (Wolf, 1973: 58) . Barnard was also active in numerous scientific and educational organizations, and he was Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Wolf, 1961: 171 ). Barnard's other lifelong interests included music and the arts, and he was active in the founding of the Bach Society of New Jersey and the Newark Art Theater. His repertory in music ranged from Bach to boogie woogie. While at the piano, upon request, Barnard would play from memory any classical composition named (Biles & Bolton, 1994 Barnard's jobs before joining AT&T until then included tuning pianos while at Harvard University, conducting a small dance orchestra, typesetting theses for students, and offering a translation service (as he had learned Italian, French and German) (Biles & Bolton, 1994; Wolf, 1961 mid-1930s . At that time he also served on committees appointed by the Secretary of Labor to study the problems of older workers in industry. He was also director of the Regional Planning Association, and was a member of the board of managers of New Jersey Reformatory at Rahway (Wolf, 1961: 171) . From 1931 through 1934, Barnard represented New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware as a director of the United States Chamber of Commerce. In 1935, he served for the second time as State Director of the New Jersey Relief Administration. At the outbreak of World War II, he was a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, the National Boys Club Movement, and Air Youth of America, as well as Honorary Chairman of the Red Cross. In 1942, Barnard succeeded Thomas E. Dewey to become the second president of the United Services Organization (USO), a morale-enhancing volunteer organization for the Allies' servicemen and -women during World War II, serving without monetary compensation (Biles & Bolton, 1994) .
After World War II, Barnard was a consultant to the United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee, and he co-authored the State Department report on International Control of Atomic Energy. In 1946, he was appointed to the Presidential Special Commission on Integration of Medical Services in the government. In 1948, Barnard left the Bell System to become President of the Rockefeller Foundation, and in 1952 he retired from that post. Barnard then became chairman of the National Science Foundation. In 1957, he was appointed to the Board of Health of the City of New York, and he served as a member of the advisory committee studying hospital administration under a program set up by the Sloan Foundation (Wolf, 1961: 171) . Barnard died on June 7, 1961, at French Hospital in Manhattan, in New York City (Wolf, 1973). struggled to provide adequate telephone service both for wartime production in the state and for business and private use.
While Barnard might have lacked technological vision, he excelled at organization-building-and a commitment to corporate welfare policies. His tenure at NJBT was marked by a sense of public service and personal integrity (Gabor, 2000: 73) . For example, at the height of the Depression in 1933, he announced a no-layoff policy -a major accomplishment even within the Bell System -choosing to reduce employees' working hours instead. Combined with his penchant for personally negotiating labor disputes, such policies inspired employee loyalty. Though never an ardent opponent of unions, Barnard believed that they were useful only in competitive businesses where "bad treatment" of employees is forced on companies by "chiseling" competitors. By contrast, he believed that AT&T was in a position to persuade employees to prefer cooperation to confrontation (Gabor, 2000) .
Barnard believed that a central challenge for management was balancing both the technological and human dimensions of organization. Moreover, he understood that this was a dynamic process, in need of constant attention and fine-tuning. Yet there is a curious discrepancy in Barnard's career at AT&T. While Gifford was almost certainly behind Barnard's promotion to the presidency of NJBT, Gifford also kept Barnard away from the "Valhalla" of AT&T: corporate headquarters in New York. There is probably some truth to Peter Drucker's contention that Gifford considered Barnard's strength as a philosopher-king superior to his performance as a hands-on executive (Gabor, 2000) . Pareto's (1935) belief in the non-logical nature of most human behavior, and also in the human need for such sentiments as duty, honor, and loyalty (Gabor, 2000) . Barnard had already read Pareto on his own in French, but he also served as a "sounding board" for Henderson subsequent to their meeting in January, 1937. 8 In the early 1930s, Barnard participated in a series of Henderson-led seminars on Pareto that attracted an interdisciplinary group of Harvard intellectuals. They shared a conservative outlook and a desire to better understand social and organizational systems and to develop a counterweight to the growing appeal of socialism. The participants included anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn, Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter, historians Crane Brinton and Bernard DeVoto, Boston lawyer, Charles Curtis, 8 Novicevic, Hench and Wren note that: "Pareto's influence on social thought in the 1930s was especially strong --not only for Barnard, but also for those involved in Harvard's "Pareto Circle" who invited Barnard to participate in their meetings and who, ultimately, figured so prominently in the ultimate publication of The Functions of the Executive (2002: 994) . Further, Barnard's (1938) appendix on "Mind in Everyday Affairs" incorporated Pareto's notion of non-logical mental processes as an explanation of human behavior. Although Mayo and Roethlisberger completed their work on the famous Hawthorne studies before he published The Functions of the Executive, Barnard said it was Pareto's teachings, via Henderson, that influenced his thinking on the pivotal role of the "informal organization"-the round-the-water-cooler conversations and relationships that often determine how the real work of the corporation gets done. (Heyl, 1968; Keller, 1984; Novicevic, Hench & Wren, 2002) .
Within this circle, Barnard was a great admirer of Parsons (1902 Parsons ( -1979 , and he and Parsons corresponded often from the late 1930s until Barnard's death in 1961. They exchanged manuscripts for commentary to each other and wrote long letters containing much theoretical discussion (Heyl, 1968) . Another important influence on Barnard's thinking was the work of Kurt Lewin, a Jewish refugee who emigrated to the U.S. from Germany in the 1930s, and a founder of the field of social psychology. As part of his work on group dynamics, Lewin (1938) an abstract and theoretical book and that would frustrate contemporary readers in many respects. To give his ideas greater precision, Barnard (1938) invented terminology that, rather than clarifying matters, made the book an especially difficult read. The seriousness of purpose that Barnard brought to the project is indicated by the fact that he rewrote the book "about eighteen or twenty times" (Wolf, 1973: 15) , and his work schedule while writing the book involved 18-hour days between business and other obligations, writing the book, and maintaining critical thinking (Wolf, 1973: 48) . Yet the hands-on experience of the working executive emerges between the lines.
The impact of Barnard (1938) on strategic management and organization theory is well documented (McMahon & Carr, 1999; Scott, 1987; Williamson, 1995) . At a broad level, Barnard (1938) reflects his wide reading in psychology, sociology, economics, anthropology, law, political theory, and philosophy of science. Importantly, Barnard presents a systems approach to the study of organization, which contains a psychological theory of motivation and behavior, a sociological theory of cooperation and complex interdependencies, and an ideology based on a meritocracy. 9 Scott submits that: "The uniqueness of Barnard's contribution stemmed from placing the concepts of behavior, motivation, and group processes into systems frameworks" (1992: 116).
Barnard (1938) provides a conceptual scheme of the theory of organization based on the following structural concepts: The Individual and Bounded Rationality; Cooperation; Formal Organization; and Informal Organization. The principal dynamic concepts 9 Barnard was highly influenced by the systems approach. In a talk to students at Johns Hopkins University in 1953 he noted that: "I have read [Ross Ashby's Design for a Brain] five times and I am certainly going to read it five more times (Andrews, 1968: xiii) . To Barnard, a system is characterized by the fact that the components to a system are interdependent variables (1938: 77-78 The Individual and Bounded Rationality. The individual is posited to be involved in activities that are the result of psychological factors. Every person has the power of choice, the capacity of determination, and the possession of free will (Pye, 1994) .
Individual judgments come from the heart or from the deepest depths of our experience (Barnard, 1948; Gehani, 2002) . 10 However, the individual is limited in terms of biological faculties or capacities (Barnard, 1938: 23) . The organization as a cooperative system is seen as overcoming an individual's physical and cognitive limitations (bounded rationality).
The Cooperative System. Barnard states that: "Cooperation ... means genuine restraint of self in many directions, it means actual service for no reward, it means courage to fight for principles rather than for things; it means genuine subjection of destructive personal interest to social interests" (Scott, 1992: 119) . Barnard comments on the risks of standing up for principles: "The people who haven't got guts enough to face [personal risks], just finally don't have guts enough to do anything" (Wolf, 1963: 93) .
When the purpose of a system of cooperation is attained, then the cooperation is said to be effective (1938: 43) . Cooperative effort is greatly limited if there is a lack of confidence in the sincerity and integrity of management. Such a lack of confidence in the 10 That Barnard placed great importance in experience there can be no doubt. Barnard states that: "The subtle effect of the education process, which is necessarily logical in its form, I think obviously leads to a false sense of intellectual superiority which closes the mind of many to the powers and the merits of others, either of inferior formal education or of education in other fields. This produces a kind of conceit. It leads to serious misjudgment of the importance of personal experience and of deliberately acquiring it" (1938: 321).
sincerity and integrity of management insidiously thwarts cooperation. 11 Barnard submits that: "When a condition of honesty and sincerity is recognized to exist, errors of judgment, defects of ability, are sympathetically endured. They are expected. Employees don't ascribe infallibility to leaders or management. What does disturb them is insincerity and the appearance of insincerity when the facts are not in their possession" (1948: 11).
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Formal Organization. Barnard provides a rational systems view of formal organization as "the concrete social process by which social action is largely accomplished …
[and] that kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful" (1938:
3-4). Barnard views the formal organization as "a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons" (Barnard, 1938: 73 11 Barnard affirms cooperative effort, stating that: "I have myself seen large groups of employees voluntarily and wholeheartedly cooperate to increase individual and collective efficiency and production in order to reduce expenses when it was recognized that the immediate effect was to the pecuniary disadvantage of the employees themselves. The importance of such collaboration to all involved is incalculable. It is neither justified, nor can it be obtained, except on the basis of a confidence inspired by experience" (1948:12). 12 Barnard further notes that: "I know of nothing more difficult to check in a management organization of tried, experienced men of integrity and of fine purpose in personal relations than this sporadic propensity to be smart, to avoid an issue, to withhold an unpleasant truth, to decline to admit an error, when honesty, sincerity, and even good sense clearly condemn such lapses" (Barnard, 1948: 11-12) .
informal society" (1938: 121). Barnard's informal organization is closely connected to the concept of organizational character (Wright, 1994) , and would likely be termed by many managers today as organization culture. Informal organization can be seen in "mores, customs, commonly held aversions, persistent beliefs, conventions, codes of morals, institutions, [and] language" (Barnard, 1948: 145) .
Barnard saw the role of the informal organization as complementary to the formal organization, and conceived of the informal organization as a far more positive force in the life of an organization than it was in Roethlisberger and Dickson's (1939) view. For
Barnard, the informal organization improves communication, enhances cohesiveness within the formal organization, and protects the integrity of the individual (Gabor, 2000) .
Informal organization "is to be regarded as a means of maintaining the personality of the individual against certain effects of formal organizations which tend to disintegrate the personality" (1938: 122). To Barnard it is the responsibility of management to strike a balance between maintaining the individual and improving organizational effectiveness.
Barnard submits that the element of the individual is of central consideration in the management of personnel and must be genuine rather than a high-sounding fiction for stimulating production. Hypocrisy, Barnard warns, is fatal in all personnel work (1948: 9).
Communication. Barnard points out that a common purpose in an organization
can only be achieved if it is commonly known, and to be known it must be communicated effectively in language, oral and written (Barnard, 1938: 89) . Tacit understandings are also often essential (Barnard, 1938: 301-322) .
Consent Theory of Authority. Swimming against the stream of the dominant flood-tide of scientific management (e.g., Taylor, 1911 ), management's authority, Barnard realized, rests in its ability to persuade, rather than to command (Golembiewski & Kuhnert, 1994; Rabin, 1994) . 13 Further, Barnard emphasized that legitimate management authority is based on functional skills and not hierarchical position (Gabor, 2000) .
A person in an organization accepts a communication as authoritative when: he can under-stand the communication; he believes that it is not inconsistent with the purpose of the organization; he believes it to be compatible with his self-interest as a whole; he is able mentally and physically to comply with it; and there exists a zone of indifference in each individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority (1938: 165-167 ). Barnard notes that: "Either as a superior officer or as a subordinate, however, I know nothing that I actually regard as more 'real' than 'authority'" (1938: 170).
14 Free Will. The concept of free will is central to Barnard's theory of behavior and is derived from those moral and legal doctrines that stress personal responsibility for actions. Endorsement of the free will doctrine underpins all his arguments concerning management's moral obligations. To Barnard, "the idea of free will is inculcated in doctrines of personal responsibility, of moral responsibility, and of legal responsibility.
This seems necessary to preserve a sense of personal integrity " (1938: 13 14 Barnard writes that: "In healthy organizations, a superior will override the judgment of a group of subordinates at his peril and only in a crisis or emergency or where a decision must be made in some new field outside their competence. The problem is not one of potential insurrection. It is rather one of maintenance of free communication between superior and subordinate men and of a workable distribution of responsibility. This is seriously injured if authority is overridden arbitrarily" (Barnard, 1948: 163) .
most difficult single organization and management task in [his] experience" (1948: vi-vii) , helped confirm his philosophy of management-especially the link between free will and acceptance of authority. At the USO, getting an organization that, at any given moment, relied on literally hundreds of thousands of volunteers to work required the voluntary consent of the governed. Authority had to be accepted; it could not be dictated. Nearly everything depended upon the moral commitment as opposed to a formal requirement (Gabor, 2000; Smith, 1994) .
Decision-making and the Decision Process.
Although the organization theory literature on decision-making from Simon (1947) to the present is expansive, Barnard provides us with his unique perspectives: "The making of decisions, as everyone knows from personal experience is a burdensome task. Offsetting the exhilaration that may result from correct and successful decision and the relief that follows the terminating of a struggle to determine issues is the depression that comes from failure or error of decision and the frustration that ensues from uncertainty " (1938: 194) .
Barnard warns of a tendency for personnel to avoid responsibility (due in part to fear of criticism) and that an executive must distribute responsibility, or otherwise run the risk of being overwhelmed with the burdens of decision. Barnard writes that: "The fine art of executive decision consists in not deciding questions that are not pertinent, in not deciding prematurely, in not making decisions that cannot be made effective, and in not making decisions that others should make " (1938: 194) . Barnard returns to this theme in an interview granted in 1961 stating that: "You put a man in charge of an organization and your worst difficulty is that he thinks he has to tell everybody what to do; and that's almost fatal if it's carried far enough" (Wolf, 1973: 30) .
Barnard also makes clear that while there is a need in developing a "science of organization" (1938: 290), such an effort will not typically be sufficient for success. An appreciation of the art of organizing is also necessary. Barnard pushes the boundaries of exposition to join the "two cultures" of the science and the art of organizing in conveying the aesthetic element in the decision-making process, which is derived from the "intimate habitual, interested experience" (1938: 235) (Levitt & March, 1995; Mahoney, 2002) .
Barnard writes that the decision-making process "transcends the capacity of merely intellectual methods and techniques of discriminating the factors of the situation. The terms pertinent to it are 'feeling,' 'judgment,' 'sense,' 'proportion,' 'balance,' [and] 'appropriateness.' It is a matter of art rather than science, and [it] is aesthetic rather than logical" (1938: 235). interest, Napoleonic dreams, love of accomplishing useful things, desire for regard of employees, love of publicity, fear of publicity-a long catalogue of non-economic motives actually condition the management of business, and nothing but the balance sheet keeps these non-economic motives from running wild. Yet without all these incentives, I think most business would be a lifeless failure" (Barnard, 1948: 15) .
Dynamic Equilibrium and the Inducement-Contributions
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Significantly, Barnard understood better than most executives -then or nowthe importance and difficulties of conventional "incentive" schemes. Barnard (1938) anticipated the sophisticated psychological reasoning of Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs and of Herzberg (1959) who referred to money as a hygiene factor and noted that not enough of it will cause dissatisfaction, but money alone does not serve as a motivator.
Indeed, Barnard (1938) perceived that the logic of conventional incentive schemes was, in essence, a self-fulfilling prophecy, and maintained that beyond a certain level of equitable compensation, employees are not necessarily driven by financial incentives.
Rather, elaborate rituals of bonuses and incentives devised by management create a 15 Barnard goes on to note that: "If you will stop taking the business man at his word and quietly watch him when he is off guard, you will find he is taking care of poor old John who couldn't be placed anywhere else, that he is risking both profit and failure rather than cut wages, that he continues an unprofitable venture on nothing but hope rather than throw his men out of work. Much of this is unsound. It would be better if economic motives did operate more effectively, but the point is that is impossible to get to the root of personnel relations or understand labor troubles or successes on the unrealistic assumption that economic motives exclusively govern. They merely limit and guide. They control more in some cases or some businesses than others " (1948: 15) . Barnard also emphasizes the desire to build personal integrity, prestige, and status and states that: "At the present time it appears to me that a large part of social discord and friction is due to the illusion that economic interests govern behavior almost exclusively in business, industrial, and political situations " (1948:78) .
Viewed from the perspective of the early 21 st century, Barnard's ideas about the importance of personal integrity and the danger of over-emphasizing economic interests, seems almost prophetic. Many of the most recent catastrophes, including the financial meltdown-in so far as it was produced by perverse economic incentives that led to the proliferation of collateralized debt obligations-or the slap-dash corner-cutting (including ignoring maintenance protocols) that led to the BP-Transocean-Deepwater-Horizon oil-rig explosion off the coast of Louisiana, appear to be the direct result of putting economic incentives ahead of the long-term health of the organizations-and systems-involved. In particular, the finger pointing among the three companies involved in the Louisiana explosion shows a stunning lack of awareness of the rig-and the entire drilling enterprise-as an exceptionally complex, interconnected system. culture of avarice in which money becomes the prevailing symbol of success.
Barnard understood the magnitude of the challenge involved in balancing organizational and individual needs: "To establish conditions under which individual pride of craft and of accomplishment can be secured without destroying the material economy of standardized production in cooperative operation is a problem in real efficiency. To maintain a character of personnel that is an attractive condition of employment involves a delicate art and much insight in the selection (and rejection) of personal services offered…To have an organization that lends prestige and secures the loyalty of desirable persons is a complex and difficult task in efficiency-in all-round efficiency, not one-sided efficiency " (1938: 94) . A corollary point, Barnard (1938) recognized, was that the efficacy of an individual's effort can be no greater than the capability of the system, or environment, in which employees work. 16 And the development and training of employees are, according to Barnard (1938) , of paramount importance (Gabor, 2000) .
Leadership, Executive Responsibility and Moral Codes. For Barnard much is
given to leaders and much is expected. Leadership is the factor of chief significance in human cooperation (Novicevic, et al., 2009) . While cooperation is the creative process, leadership is the "indispensable fulminator of its forces" (Barnard, 1938: 259) . The fundamental function of a leader is to create meaning for followers that will facilitate 16 In recognizing that the individual employee can have only limited impact on the system, Barnard also anticipated the quality management work of W. Edwards Deming (1986 Deming ( , 1994 who himself was influenced by the statistical theories of Walter Shewhart. Shewhart worked at AT&T during the 1920s-though it is unclear whether Barnard was aware of Shewhart's work, which focused on quality improvement at the Western Electric plant in Chicago. Deming observed that a system can only be improved if it is "in control," i.e., when the variation inherent to every system is predictable. Deming's observation provided an important statistical foundation for the systems view of organizational improvement. Deming maintained that an individual's performance could not be evaluated independently of the system within which he or she worked.
their commitment and identification. Barnard writes that: "The inculcation of belief in the real existence of a common purpose is an essential executive function " (1938: 87 weaken cooperation and what will increase it" (Barnard, 1948: 86-87) .
Leadership then must go beyond deciding what the right thing to do is, and to move onto the job of getting it done (Barnard, 1952 (Wolf, 1973: 7-8) . Leadership then involves the guidance of conduct of others and it requires "wide imaginations and understanding" (Barnard, 1945: 176) . Indeed, leaders need to be more effective than others both in conveying meanings and intentions and in receiving them with sympathetic understanding (1948: 97-99) . Barnard (1948: 109-110) describes the nature of leadership, stating that:
It is in the nature of a leader's work that he should be a realist and should recognize the need for action, even when the outcome cannot be foreseen, but also that he should be idealist and in the broadest sense pursue goals some of which can only be attained in a succeeding generation of leaders. Many leaders when they reach the apex of their powers have not long to go, and they press onward by paths the ends of which they will not themselves reach. In business, in education, in government, in religion, again and again, I see men who, I am sure, are dominated by this motive, though unexpressed, and by some queer twist of our present attitudes often disavowed. Yet, 'Old men [and old women] plant trees.'... to shape the present for the future by the surplus of thought and purpose which we now can muster seems the very expression of the idealism which underlies such social coherence as we presently achieve, and without this idealism we see no worthy meaning in our lives, our institutions, or our culture.
In the expression, "old men [and old women] plant trees" Barnard indicates that the moral factor is real and articulates the theme of Durkheim (1933) that organic solidarity may be based on the flimsiest of grounds and yet continue to exist. 17 Within the cooperative system, the moral factor finds its concrete expression and suggests the necessity of leadership and "the power of individuals to inspire cooperative personal decision by creating faith (emphasis added): faith in common understanding, faith in the probability of success, faith in the ultimate satisfaction of personal motives, faith in the integrity of objective authority, faith in the superiority of common purpose as a personal aim of those who partake in it" (Barnard, 1938: 259) .
For Barnard, the part of leadership that determines the quality and morality of action is responsibility. Responsibility is the "quality which gives dependability and determination to human conduct, and foresight and ideality to purpose " (1938: 260 (1948: 95) . Carrying out this function also helps build the character of the executive who must practice deciding and acting under the burden of responsibility. Barnard in 1961, looking backward on his classic states that: "In my opinion, the great weakness of my book is that it doesn't deal adequately with the question of responsibility and its delegation. The emphasis is too much on authority, which is the subordinate subject. ...
The emphasis is put on authority which, to me now, is a secondary, derivative setup" (Wolf, 1973: 15) .
Ultimately, Barnard maintains that: "nearly everything depends upon the moral commitment. I'm perfectly confident that, with occasional lapses, if I make a date with you, whom I have never met, you'll keep it and you'll feel confident that I'll keep it; and there's absolutely nothing binding that makes us do it. And yet the world runs on thatyou just couldn't run a college, you couldn't run a business, you couldn't run a church, couldn't do anything except on the basis of the moral commitments that are involved in what we call responsibility. You can't operate a large organization unless you can delegate responsibility, not authority but responsibility" (Wolf, 1973: 35) . Ethical practice determines management's moral authority and the capability of managers to pass their power on to the next generation.
For Barnard (1938) to a large extent management decisions are concerned with moral issues, and the survival of the organization as a going concern depends on moral commitment. 19 Barnard writes that: "Organizations endure, however, in proportion to the breadth of morality by which they are governed. This is only to say that foresight, long purposes, high ideals are the basis for the persistence of cooperation " (1938: 282) .
Organizations that can build a culture that inspires members to transcend short-term interest will have a distinct advantage (Mahoney, Huff & Huff, 1994a, b; Miller, 1992) .
Finally, we emphasize here that Chester Barnard as a participant observer was at home in both the real world of business and in the theoretical realm of academia; he had the unique ability to make connections between the latest developments in psychology, sociology and the emerging discipline of organizational behavior. Barnard strived to combine the two cultures of management-its science and its art-and called for "a social anthropology, a sociology, a social psychology, an institutional economics, a treatise on management" (1938: 293) in developing the "science of organization " (1938: 290) . However, Barnard warns that we should not deceive ourselves by thinking that a science of organization will be enough: "Inspiration is necessary to inculcate the sense of unity, and to create common ideals. Emotional rather than intellectual acceptance is required" (1938: 293). Barnard concludes his classic work with this observation: "I believe that the expansion of cooperation and the development of the individual are mutually dependent realities, and that a due proportion or balance between them is a necessary condition of human welfare" (Barnard, 1938: 296) . 
